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Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce:
Supplementing Formal Equality
with Substantive Change
ERIN R. MELNICK*
INTRODUCTION

The notion of substantive equality has weaved its way through the feminist
movement, since the promises of formal equality failed to realize the goals of feminist
reformers. Formal equality promised that women, once legally recognized as the
"same" as men, would no longer suffer gender-biased injustices under the law.' While
the promulgation of gender-neutral laws 2 has helped break down some traditional
gender norms,3 the law of equal opportunity has not achieved equality of results. For
example, in the employment setting, formal equality has evolved into a "separate but
equal" doctrine4 that formally promises equal opportunity in the workplace, but
actually gives rise to "mommy tracks,"5 sexual harassment, and "Darwinian
selection." 6
This Note will explore the tension between formal and substantive equality for
women that arises in the most recent debate over no-fault divorce reform. As some
state legislatures now consider a return to fault-based divorce law7 to solve the

* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1997,
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. I would like to thank Professor Lynne Henderson
for her suggestions, comments, and enthusiasm for feminist jurisprudence. Thank you to my
parents for their unwavering faith in my abilities. A special thank you to Stephen J. Schrantz,
Jr., who challenges and inspires me.
1.See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Reflections on the FeministLegal Thought
of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9.
2. An example of a gender-neutral lav is the creation of a cause of action for sex
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
3. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (noting that some women
want to enter military academies with rigorous training and "adversative method").
4. Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALEL.J. 1731, 1760 (1991).
5. Id.at 1757-59. Rhode gives examples ofhow formal equality, or equal access, does not
lead to substantive equality, or equal acceptance and success. Particularly, many women who
brea:. into the corporate world find themselves unable to advance up the corporate ladder as
quickly as their male counterparts. This "mommy track" phenomenon is not sufficiently
addressed by formal equality, but rather is a product of substantive inequalities in the
workplace that benefit men over women. See Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the
Legal Profession,A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941 (1991).
6. Rhode, supranote 4, at 1768. Rhode uses the term "Darwinian selection" to refer to
the problematic focus on "sameness." She argues that those who do succeed in the corporate
world succeed because of their ability to conform to male norms. Once these "similarly
situated" women achieve success, however, they become the least suited to address the
inadequacies of the system.
7. See 1998 La. Sess. Law Serv. I (West). The Louisiana state legislature has a committee
researching the benefits of a return to fault-based divorce law. Many state legislatures,
including Louisiana's, have passed covenant marriage laws, which make divorce more difficult
by allowing couples to specify grounds for dissolution. Covenant marriages, while optional,
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perceived deterioration of marriage,' this Note suggests that such a step back will
adversely affect women's lives.
Part I will enumerate and analyze traditional arguments against no-fault divorce,
specifically focusing on the law's financial impact on women and its impact on
women in battering relationships. This section will also examine the increased
privatization of marriage-a response to the inadequacies of no-fault divorce. After
examining these arguments against no-fault divorce, Part II will explore solutions that
seek to improve the lives of women based on changes in substantive equality. This
Part will cast the discussion of no-fault divorce reform back into the larger context
of substantive equality solutions in order to illustrate the following principle. Rather
than dropping formal equality-in this context, no-fault divorce-when it does not
provide a fully satisfying solution, the legal system and society as a whole should
supplement formal equality with substantive changes in order to achieve equal
opportunity and success for women. 9
Finally, Part III will apply the substantive equality arguments in Part II to
developing gender-biased and morally coded laws in China. In light of proposed
adultery laws in China and the economic and social status of Chinese women, this
Part will illustrate, by example, how changes in substantive equality can and must
supplement formal equality in order to improve the lives of women. Through this
example, this Note concludes that while a reversion to gender-biased laws may, in
some instances, benefit women, such laws ultimately serve as a "quick-fix" for
problems that should find resolution only through a combination of formal legal
equality and substantive social change.

1.THE ADVENT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE:
GAPS LEFT BY FORMAL EQUALITY

Many lawmakers around the world argued for the end of fault-based divorce law
to stop the legal hoop-jumping that comes with assigning blame.' ° Where one party

indicate a popular trend toward (or back to) fault-based divorce laws.
8. See Suzanne McBride, Legislative Panel OKs Doubling Waiting Time To Obtain a
Divorce, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 15, 1998, at C1; Cheryl Wetzstein, Erosion of Marriage,
MoralsSeen in Millennium, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al; see alsoJ. HERBIEDIFONzO,
BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-

CENTURY AMERICA 176 (1997) (describing measures taken by different states in response to
the perceived failure of no-fault divorces).
9. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE

RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991). Fineman argues that "given the

socioeconomic factors that typically disadvantage women in the market while simultaneously
favoring their assumption of the major domestic responsibilities, result-equality [substantive
equality] should have been the objective of [divorce] reforms." Id. at 4. While I do agree with
Fineman's argument that formal equality has its pitfalls, I am not advocating what she terms
"equality of result" laws. Rather than adopting facially biased laws to protect women's rights,
I am advocating substantive social changes in order to ensure equality of result and supplement
formal equality.
10. See, e.g., THE LAW COMMISSION, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DIVORCE: THE FIELD

OF CHOICE, 1966, Cmnd. 3123, at 5.
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had to commit an enumerated fault to secure a divorce, often times spouses would
actively engage in perjury to fulfill the legal requirement." This put lawyers in a
particularly uncomfortable position, and thus contributed to their support for no-fault
divorce laws. Feminists also advocated no-fault divorce laws as part of a "genderneutral paradigm for reform."' 2 Such a paradigm attempted to eliminate
characterizations of women as inferior to men by eliminating laws that cast the legal
rights of women and men in different lights. 3
No-fault divorces gave both spouses the opportunity to leave the marriage
unilaterally-a change that many liberal feminists viewed as a victory for equal
opportunity. With the advent of no-fault divorce, however, came a recognition of the
gap between the ideal and the reality. The "rhetoric" of formal equality presumed that
men and women, once given equal opportunity, would achieve equal success.' 4 Nofault divorce law quickly drew attention to the still pervasive "culturally constructed
and socially maintained positions of inequality" that relegated women to an inferior
social status.' 5
A. FinancialStatus of Women
Although many critics of no-fault divorce law have argued that the reform has a
negative impact on the financial well-being of divorced women, 6 the issue of
causation remains questionable. 7 Regardless of a causal relationship, no-fault
divorces have emphasized already existing inequalities within the home, marriage,
and workplace that impact the financial status of women postdivorce.
1. Dynamics of Home and Marriage
While women largely bear the majority of child-rearing responsibility at home,
fault-based divorce gave them a bargaining power that no-fault divorce
relinquished. 8 Under fault-based divorce, husbands at fault seeking divorces could
only obtain one if their wives consented; under such a system, wives could use the
husbands' desire to divorce as a bargaining chip for better divorce settlements.' 9 For

11. See NORMAN A. KATrER, CONDUCT, FAULT AND FAMILY

LAW 68 (1987).
12. FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 3; see also Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming

the Questions,Questioningthe Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM ATTHE CROSSROADS 191, 195

(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). Rhode and Minow point out that
women's concerns were largely absent from no-faultdivorce reform discussions; feminists who
did in fact participate voiced their desire for gender-neutral laws, which lack responsiveness
to the everyday divorce experiences of most women.
13. See FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 20-21.
14.Id. at29.
15. Id.
16. See LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA

(1985).

17. See Rhode & Minow, supranote 12, at 197; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the
Familyfrom the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 835 (1998).
18. See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 79-80 (1992).
19. See id.
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those women who had devoted many years to marriage and child-rearing, this
bargaining chip constituted the primary means of securing adequate financial support
after a divorce.
Early feminist reformers, while focused on gender-neutral laws, did not totally
ignore this void created by no-fault divorce law. In line with the goals of gender
neutrality, early reformers proposed equal division of property between husband and
wife at divorce,20 thereby giving economic value to the services of the career
homemaker. This proposed property division scheme reflected the reformers' primary
focus on the stereotypical victimized homemaker.2 Critics of the no-fault divorce
reform, however, quickly pointed out that equal division of property presumed an
"equal social and economic position" in society,22 that for many women, remained
an unrealized ideal.23 The careerhomemaker may have gotten an equal share from the
divorce, but might have found herself cast into the marketplace without any skills.
Those women falling outside the characterization of "homemaker" found their
diverse needs largely unaddressed and unimproved by the divorce reform.
The dynamics within individual marriages made equal division of property a
suspect solution for securing the well-being of women after divorce. The genderneutral default rule of equal property division did not consider the nature of each
individual marriage relationship. For example, women who had devoted their lives
to domestic responsibility received the same percentage of property at divorce as did
women who had college degrees and better employment opportunities.24 Women who
had dual responsibilities-in the domestic and market spheres-also received an
equal proportion of the property despite greater contributions than their spouses.25
Furthermore, equality-based rules for divorce failed to recognize the vast difference
in marriages across cultural, educational, and socioeconomic backgrounds.26 Early
liberal feminists paid little attention to the vulnerable position of women whose lives
did not reflect equal positions in society, and the solution they offered (equal property
division), more often than not, undervalued the contributions these women
generated.27
2. Opportunities for Women in the Workplace
In addition to revealing inequities within many marriages, no-fault divorce also
exposed problems women faced in the workplace-problems that further
disadvantaged women's financial well-being upon divorce. No-fault divorce may
have helped encourage women to gain greater financial independence, 2 but the

20. See FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 33.
21.Seeid. at 47.
22.Id. at 36.
23. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 195.
24. See id. at 196.
25. See FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 47.
26. See id. at 30; Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 196.
27. See FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 29.
28. See Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigorationof the Traditional
Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 525 (1998). Again the issue of causation, here between no-fault
divorce and women's increased desire for financial independence, seems less relevant to the
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transition to the labor market uncovered substantive gender biases, making the goal
of financial independence more challenging for most women.
To begin, many women may not have even perceived the potential disadvantages
awaiting them in the workplace. 29 Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow suggest that
"traditional family structures,"30 -the two (heterosexual) parent family-contribute
to a woman's inability to recognize her potential disadvantage in the marketplace.3
In an ongoing marriage, the entire family shares in the salary advantages and jobrelated medical, insurance, and pension benefits that disproportionately
accompany malejobs. A wife is thus somewhat shielded from the full force of her
disadvantages in a wage economy; she contributes her lower wages and
uncompensated domestic laborto enhance the family's well-being without having
to sustain herself and her children on that inadequate economic base. 2
This argument suggests that marriage helps minimize the disadvantages women
face in the marketplace, because married women can benefit from the higher wages
their male spouses earn.3 Divorce, then, severs this arrangement, forcing most
women into a gender-biased labor force. No-fault divorce does not create these
gender biases, but poignantly exposes them.
Note that Rhode and Minow's argument somewhat undermines the notion that
fault-based divorce law gave women better bargaining power than no-fault divorce.
If women could not fully perceive the disadvantages awaiting them in the
marketplace because of a beneficial and protective marriage arrangement, they most
likely would not bargain for better divorce settlements. The institution of
nonegalitarian marriage, rather than divorce law, contributed to women's financial
dependence by presenting an unreliable promise-as "costs oftraditional gender roles
will not be borne by women alone."34 Such a promise did not always last, and divorce
merely emphasized the heavy burdens such a compromise placed on women once the
marriage dissolved.

evaluation of the limits of formal equality. Itend to agree with Abrams that while some women
felt forced by divorce laws to find independent financial support, many women already sought
that independence. Rather than trying to resolve the question of causation, I prefer to focus on
the problems facing women in the workplace, whether they work by choice or necessity.
29. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 193.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id. (footnote omitted).
33. See id.
34. Id.
at 194. This language implies that women can assume domestic responsibilities,
since their earning potential is less than their male counterparts, and men can be the wage
earners. Marriage represents a "promise" that women will not suffer because of the role they
assume-men will benefit from the role women take, and women will benefit from the role
men take, as long as the union persists. Id. at 193-94; see also, Bartlett, supra note 17, at 837.
Bartlett characterizes this "promise" as the "marital bargaining table" where women assume
a disproportionate share of domestic responsibility in light of their poorer options for market
employment. Id.
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The equal division of property standard resulting from no-fault divorce reform
35
.failed adequately to consider the ability of women to meet their future needs.
Looking at the range ofsocial and economic positions of women upon divorce,36 even
the woman with the most equitable division of work and domestic responsibility with
her spouse might suffer under the equal division of property model. While at the
moment of divorce, both spouses might, hypothetically, have property matching their
contributions, the woman's share of the property would likely be insufficient to
compensate her disadvantaged status in the labor force."
Despite the increased number of women entering the labor market today, many
tangible and intangible gender biases permeate it. Some women still receive less
compensation than their male counterparts for doing the same work.3" Despite the
implementation of Title VII,39 many women still work in lower paying, lower status,
traditionally "female" jobs segregated from men.4" Such sex segregation perpetuates
stereotypes about women's desire and ability to maintain positions in certain maledominated job fields.4
These stereotypes also disadvantage women in less tangible ways. For example,
women often face the double bind of being characterized as overly feminine or not
"feminine enough"; 42 often "what is viewed as assertive in a man is abrasive in a
woman." 43 These conflicting messages facing women in the workplace are
compounded by criticism of working women from other societal groups. Some critics
cast their disapproval in terms of biological predisposition-women, by nature,

35. See FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 47.
36. See id. Fineman points out that while some women could afford the luxury of domestic
responsibility and others could afford to hire someone else to take that responsibility, many
women had the dual responsibility of "unfulfilling jobs" and "maintaining a home." Id. This
range ofwomen's experience demonstrates the narrow applicability offormal equality doctrine,
specifically the minimal help provided for women from equal property distribution. See id.
Furthermore, Fineman argues that the automatic default rule of equal property division
obviates the need for any inquiry into the unique circumstances of a woman's financial status.
See id. at 49. The shortcomings of such a rule become self-perpetuating.
37. See id.
38. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1758.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
40. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretations
ofSex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII CasesRaising the Lack ofInterestArgument,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (1990).
41. See id. at 1750-58. This is the foundation for Schultz's criticism of many sex
segregation cases. She suggests that when courts dismiss such cases on the grounds that
women merely "lack interest" inparticular jobs, they fail to recognize the role employers play
in shaping women's employment preferences. Preferences, Schultz argues, are not fixed.
Employers wanting to include women in their workplaces could do so by actively recruiting
them. See id.
42. Rhode, supra note 4, at 1753.
43. Id.; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989) (noting that the
employer viewed candidates "favorably if partners believed they maintained their femin[in]ity
while becoming effective professional managers").
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should thrive on domestic responsibility.' The media,4" conservative politicians, 46
and the New Right47 also attack working women as the source of deterioration of the
traditional family.48
In both the domestic and labor spheres, women have confronted challenges to their
need and desire for financial independence. No-fault divorce has helped emphasize
these challenges by exposing the gender biases inherent in traditional family
arrangements and work opportunities. Probably the single greatest hurdle facing
women's financial well-being and independence is that society still casts the need to
improve the balance between work and family responsibilities as a woman's
problem. 49 Regardless of the gaps in equal treatment that no-fault divorce exposed,
solutions bridging those gaps will come slowly if society continues to view solutions
in gendered terms.
B. The Unique ChallengesFacingBattered
Women upon Divorce
Women in battering relationships represent a unique set of concerns arising from
the advent of no-fault divorce reform. Gender-neutral divorce law, combined with
stereotypical images of battered women, creates a hostile courtroom environment for
women in abusive relationships."0 No-fault divorce law arguably makes the existence
of a battering relationship moot."' Because either party can unilaterally seek a divorce
without assigning fault, a woman victimized by a battering relationship has no reason
to believe that her story of abuse would play any role in a divorce proceeding. On a
purely technical level, no-fault divorce law makes the introduction of evidence
proving abuse useless for battered women.
Compounding the legal futility of introducing evidence of a battering relationship,
many women face judges and social workers who may harbor stereotypical views
about battered women. 2 A common image of the battered woman is one of
"exceptionality" and "dysfunctionality"' 3 -battered women represent the exception
to the rule and only exist because of some personality flaw or weakness. Often,
from low selfbattered women invoke the erroneous image of someone5' suffering
4
helplessness.
"learned
and
delusion,
irrationality,
esteem,

44. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1745-46.
45. See Abrams, supranote 28, at 526.
46. See id.
47. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1745-46.
48. See Abrams, supranote 28, at 526.
49. See DIFONZO, supra note 8, at 173-74. "Nor are women any closer to resolving the
work/family dilemma .... Id. at 174.
50. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation,90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (1991).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 37-38.
54. Id. at 38.
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Arguably, no-fault divorce law, as a gender-neutral law, helps perpetuate these
stereotypical images of battered women." By removing any evidence of battering
from a divorce proceeding, "no-fault divorce laws may have indirectly contributed
to cultural stereotypes of battered women by removing public blame of the
perpetrator of the violence. Once the man as bad actor disappears, it is easy to shift
the focus to the woman."56 The no-fault divorce process leaves battered women in a
Catch-22. Although she could alert a judge during a divorce proceeding of her
battering spouse, 5she
may have very legitimate reasons to fear the implications of
7
such a disclosure.
While no-fault divorce denies a battered woman the opportunity to give voice to
her abuse, it simultaneously reinforces stereotypical images of battered women
through her court-imposed silence. No-fault divorce-as it impacts battered women
-does more than point out preexistent gender-based inequalities; it actually fosters
and perpetuates them.
C. IncreasedPrivatizationof Marriage
Another dominant ideology exacerbates the gaps exposed by no-fault divorce laws:
the emphasis on marriage as a private concern. 8 Under fault-based divorce, spouses
bargained for the best settlement and division of property their bargaining power
could achieve. With the reduced bargaining power many women experienced under
no-fault law, women who did not reach an agreement were subjected to the default
rule of equal property division. Women who minimally benefitted from equal
property division and needed additional financial support revealed the problems
inherent in a "laissez-faire" policy toward marriage.59 Privatization of marriage-as
an example of the promise of formal equality, gender-neutrality, and individual
autonomy-only revealed the underlying disparities between men and women in and
after marriage.'

55. See id. at 46. Mahoney also discusses how these stereotypical images of battered
women disadvantage women in custody proceedings by devaluing women's care-giving
contributions. in favor of less "gendered" factors-for example, providing financial support.
Id. at45.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 45-46. Also, if a battered woman raises the issue of abuse at a custody
proceeding, she may face other unfavorable implications-usually her behavior becomes the
focus of psychological evaluation where she may be stereotyped as "unreliable." Id.
58. See id. at 18; Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 191.
59. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 192. The authors appropriately qualify the
characterization of the state's role in marriage-often, as they discuss, the state does intervene
in marriage and family when it classifies particular things as "private" as well as when it sets
public policy regarding taxes, welfare, and child care. Id.
60. Rhode and Minow characterize the inadequacies of the "private" marriage distinction
as follows:
Given the persistent sex-based disparities in social, economic, and political
resources in this society, such laissez-faire policies are not gender-neutral. As in
other contexts, the abdication of state responsibility on divorce-related issues has
served to reinforce gender inequalities. These inequalities are not simply private
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Currently, the privatization and contractualization of marriage is gaining
widespread popularity with the adoption of covenant marriage laws. Covenant
marriages, like those now available in Louisiana, allow couples to enter a marriage
with specified counseling periods, separation periods, and enumerated terms for
dissolution.6 Even greater privatization of marriage has been suggested, giving
spouses broad discretion to tailor their marriage to a set ofnegotiated terms, enforced
by the courts, and independent of interference by the state.62 Proponents of the
covenant marriage and privatization of marriage argue that both spouses will have
increased bargaining power within the marriage and more security in the durability
of the marriage to take on specialized responsibilities 3 -an arrangement that would
equally benefit both parties to the "contract."
Privatization of the marriage contract, like no-fault divorce and equal property
distribution rules, erroneously presupposes equal social positions for men and women
that currently do not exist. Increased privatization of the marriage contract assumes
that men and women have equal bargaining power going into a marriage and thus can
negotiate for the terms most favorable to them' -an ideal of formal equality that for
many women remains a fiction.
Some critics of privatization have argued that women may experience greater
pressure, both socially and financially, to get married,65 which would reduce their
willingness to fight for favorable marriage terms. Also, women, when faced with a
variety of options and combinations of work and domestic responsibilities-as well
as "conflicting social signals" about the traditional female roles in society' -may
experience more difficulty assessing future goals than their prospective spouses.67
These factors not only limit the ability of many women to adequately bargain for
equitable and egalitarian marriages, but also risk the possibility of reinforcing
preexistent inequalities within marriage."
In light of these concerns, increased privatization of marriage begins to resemble
another gender-neutral principle, founded in notions of formal equality and increased
individual freedom, but lacking in substantive change. Much like no-fault divorce and
equal distribution of property laws, privatization of marriage only highlights-and
arguably exacerbates-preexistent substantive inequality.

concerns. The growing number of divorced women and children in serious need
is a matter of profound public importance.
Id. at 192-93.
61. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-:273 (West Supp. 1999).
62. See Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Liing the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizingthe MarriageContract,73 IND. L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998).
63. See id. at 466-67. The authors point out that specialization in "traditional homemaking
tasks" would not benefit either spouse since such tasks do not transfer well. Id. at 467.
However, they do not address the social reality that women largely shoulder such tasks with
little ability to bargain them away.
64. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 518.
65. See id. at 520.
66. Id. at 522.
67. See id. at 521-22.
68. See id. at 522-23.
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II. SUPPLEMENTING FORMAL EQUALITY LAW WITH
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE-PRESERVING NO-FAULT DIVORCE

The Louisiana legislature has instructed a committee to investigate the possibility
of reinstating fault-based divorce law."9 This signals a trend among many states
looking for ways to decrease a perceived increase in divorce rate 0 and decline in
traditional family values. 7' Most likely, the concerns addressed in Part I of this Note
do not fuel this legal trend. The impact of no-fault divorce on women's well-being
seems to factor minimally into the current discussion about divorce reform.
Part II ofthisNote attempts to injectwomen's perspectives back into the discussion
of a proposed return to fault-based divorce laws by demonstrating that such a return
would do little to improve women's financial well-being upon divorce and physical
safety from battering spouses. Furthermore, this section hopes to demonstrate that
while no-fault divorce-as a formal equality rule-has exposed many gender-based
disparities in the culture of work and family, supplementing rule equality with
substantive social change offers a better solution for women than reinstating gendered
laws.
A. Criticizingthe Criticisms ofNo-FaultDivorceWomen's FinancialStatus
Early critics of no-fault divorce relied heavily on a study by Lenore Weitzman
seeking to demonstrate the increased disadvantages women suffered under a no-fault
divorce, equal property division regime."' Many of those disadvantages are
enumerated in Part I. Any proposed return to fault-based divorce that values the wellbeing of women must acknowledge more current disputes regarding Weitzman's
73
study.
Most critically, her underlying assertion-that no-fault divorce caused increased
economic hardship for women-has been widely disputed and seriously questioned.74
First, some critics have shown that women's financial position under a fault-based
regime wasjust as poor as their status under new no-fault rules. Second, while some

69. See 1998 La. Sess. Law Serv. H.R. No. I (West).
70. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriageas Contract, OpportunisticViolence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 725 (noting that the
divorce rate has declined since 1979).
71. See, e.g., Editorial, MakingMarriagesStronger, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Oct. 21, 1998,
at A10; Editorial, The Ties that Bind, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 23, 1998, at A16.
72. See WErIZMAN, supra note 16.
73. See Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation ofthe Economic Consequences ofDivorce,
61 AM. Soc. REV. 528 (1996); Richard R. Peterson, StatisticalErrors,Faulty Conclusions,
Midguided Policy: Reply to Weitzman, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 539 (1996); see also Saul D.
Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economic Consequences ofDivorce Are

Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson,61 AM. SOC. REV. 537 (1996).
74. See Bartlett, supranote 17, at 835.
75. See Marsha Garrison, The EconomicsofDivorce: ChangingRules, ChangingResults,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 75-101 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
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women had improved bargaining power under a fault-based divorce, those women
typically did not want a divorce---their husbands did. For women who desired a
divorce, or whose actions fell within "faulf' categories, fault rules actually increased
the cost of divorce.76 Finally, as discussed in Part I.A.2., women who could not fully
perceive the disadvantages awaiting them in the marketplace, because of a beneficial
and protective marriage arrangement, most likely would not bargain forbetter divorce
settlements under a fault-based system-no-fault divorce would not injure them
financially any more than settlements under fault-based divorce.
B. Proposalsfor Substantive Changesfrom
Within and Without Marriage
The impact of no-fault divorce will not continue to fall disproportionately on
women if substantial changes take place within and without the "traditional"
marriage. While these proposals for change are not new, the new possibility of
reinstating fault requires the serious revisiting and implementation of them.77
Specifically, this section will focus on arguments (1) encouraging egalitarian
marriage; (2) giving greater value to domestic responsibilities; and (3) breaking down
the public/private distinction in marriage.
Egalitarian marriage represents an achievable ideal. It offers a marital promise
different from that ofthe traditional family bargain." The promise is of a more equal,
interdependent marriage, that also helps ensure upon divorce that women will not
disproportionately suffer financial hardship. Egalitarian marriage embodies shared
domestic responsibilities, shared work opportunities outside of the home, and greater
interdependence.79

Karen Czapanskiy has articulated the need for equality within marriage, focusing
specifically on parental equality. 0 She argues that while most mothers of minor
children work both inside and outside of the home, most working fathers participate

minimally in household responsibilities and child-rearing. 8 As the feminist
movement has encouraged women's increased participation in the labor force, no

eds., 1990); Herbert Jacob, Another Look atNo-FaultDivorce andthe Post-DivorceFinances
of Women, 23 L. & Soc'y REv. 95, 111 (1989).
76. See Amy L. Wax, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Futurefor

EgalitarianMarriage?,84 VA. L. REv. 509, 639-40 (1998).
77. This section of the Note draws on arguments and proposals made by feminists in
response to problems exposed by no-fault divorce. Many of those arguments and proposals did
not contemplate the current possibility of reverting to fault-based divorce. This Note attempts
to revisit these arguments but will examine them in the context of the current divorce debate.
78. See supraPart I.A. This section discusses the failed marriage promise that women alone
will not bear the burden of traditional gender roles. Hypothetically, such a promise would free
women to take all of the domestic responsibilities while allowing men to pursue employment
in the marketplace. However, divorce marked the end of the promise, and women inevitably
bore the financial burden of their sacrifice.
79. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 198.
80. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor ParentalEquality,

38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
81. See idat 1415-16.
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equivalent legal movement has encouraged fathers to participate more fully in
domestic responsibilities. 2 Czapanskiy posits that family law actually encourages this
division of household labor.83 Examining the custody rights of unwed mothers and
fathers, she offers the following observation: "[T]he late twentieth century award of
custody rights to unwed fathers has not been accompanied by a wholesale change in
the duties of fathers ....
By giving fathers greater legal rights to their children, it does not follow that fathers
will shoulder greater responsibility for the care of their children. This observation
supports this Note's argument that changing gender-biased laws to gender-neutral
laws will not hasten substantive change. Gender-neutral laws must accompany
changes within marriage, changes designed to increase shared responsibility and
maximize egalitarian ideals.
The sharing of responsibilities is a necessity under any divorce regime if society
values the well-being of women and families."5 In a culture that values independence
and autonomy so highly, allowing women to assume disproportionate shares of
domestic responsibility while relying on a spouse to provide financial support creates
an unacceptable dependency. 6 This dependency not only prevents women from
achieving financial independence upon divorce, but also threatens the stability of the
traditional family should the care-giving mother become unable to fulfill her role.
The time spent, whether full or shared, on domestic responsibilities must receive
greater valuation within the marriage and at the time of divorce. Under her "equalityas-acceptance model," 7 Christine Littleton proposes that women who choose a fulltime domestic role should not suffer because they differ from those (mostly men and
some women) who "engage in culturally male behavior."8 8 Littleton even offers a
specific way to reduce the "cost" for women who stay at home-she suggests that the
government could pay mothers wages and benefits comparable to the wages and
benefits paid to most soldiers.8 9 Also, she suggests that motherhood could serve as a
prerequisite for some governmental jobs, much like veteran's status. Littleton's
suggestions not only offer women monetary value for their care-giving roles, but also
give greater incentive for men to participate in the traditionally female realm of
domestic responsibility.
These proposals would generate greater interdependence and egalitarianism within
marriage as well as give women improved ability upon divorce to gain or maintain
financial independence. Without these proactive steps to give greater value to
domestic work, many women solely rely on the traditional promise ofmarriage-that

82. See id. at 1452.
83. See id. at 1415-16.
84. Id. at 1425.
85. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 533.
86. See id.
87. Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1284-85
(1987). Under Littleton's model, differences should be costless. See id. Whether women take
on domestic roles because of biological predisposition ot cultural shaping is not a particularly
relevant issue. See id.
88. Id. at 1285.
89. See id. at 1329-30.
90. See id. at 1330 & n.262.
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they will not bear the burden of their choices alone. Ensuring that women's domestic
contributions receive sufficient monetary value upon divorce requires more than a
verbal promise, or even a written covenant marriage contract, by a spouse.9 "It
requires spouses who have been socialized to value familial work, not only when they
'
know they are going to need it, but after it has been done."92
This point leads to the third, and possibly most critical, need for change: rethinking
the characterization of marriage as a private concern. Cultural and societal practices
play a crucial role in how people conceive of marriage and marriage roles.93 Making
marriage more egalitarian and giving value to domestic work requires support from
institutions outside of the marriage, both public and private.9" For example, helping
families care for their children during marriage and after divorce requires improved
state assistance and employment flexibility." Such assistance would enable women
to explore more fully work options outside of the home.
Also, in terms of property division upon divorce, Deborah Rhode and Martha
Minow propose a partnership model based on egalitarian notions ofmarriage.96They
suggest that the state take a more proactive role in defining what assets are available
for property distribution upon divorce and what standards should be utilized for the
allocation of that marital property.97 Under this model, Rhode and Minow attempt to
create more substantive equality through egalitarian ideals, while recognizing the
persistence of gender-based roles that may harm women.98 The state could actively
help counter the lingering gender biases, both in spouses' private distribution of
domestic tasks and in workplace settings, that prevent women from achieving
financial independence upon divorce."
These few suggestions recognize that increased privatization of the family will
only exacerbate the gender-based inequalities that result from a complex interaction
between family roles, state policies, and market forces.100 Substantive change cannot
come from focusing on justthe familial element ofthis interwoven system. Reverting
to a fault-based divorce scheme will not resolve the substantive inequalities that
plague nonegalitarian, privatized marriages.

91. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 533.
92. Id.
93. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 193 (noting the role of cultural norms that
influence gender socialization and the resulting inequalities within the family); see alsoMartha
Fineman, Roundtable: Opportunitiesfor and Limitations ofPrivate Ordering inFamily Law,
73 IND. L.J. 535, 542 (1998) (suggesting that privatizing the family hides the dependency of
care-taking women).
94. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 533 (discussing the need for a public sector willing to
train women in transition between divorce and financial independence as well as a private
sector willing to hire women who have been out of the labor market for many years).
95. See id.
96. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 198-99.
97. See id. at 199.
98. See id.
99. See id.
at 194.
100. See id.
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C. Workplace Reforms for GenderEquality

Returning to a fault-based divorce system will not address the problems impeding
women's financial success in the marketplace. Rather, this Note advocates
supplementing a no-fault divorce system with improvements to employment
environments and opportunities. Women need greater access to nontraditional jobs.
Additionally, they need greater equality in jobs they already occupy.
Increasing the variety ofjob opportunities for women serves two critical functions
in terms of a discussion about financial independence upon divorce. For a woman,
a job matching her goals and interests will offer a more fulfilling and financially
rewarding experience. For the labor force, bringing women into traditionally maledominated employment settings helps break down gender biases, sex harassment, and
sex segregation,'"' all factors that cyclically perpetuate women's disadvantaged status
in the workforce. 2
Vicki Schultz suggests that the courts take a more informed perspective in
evaluating sex segregation cases, by recognizing the false and harmful assumption
that women enter male-dominated work environments at their own risk." 3 Through
increased understanding of the complex ways in which women's work experiences
continually shape their work preferences, courts can take a more critical look at
employer practices and work environments."° If courts take a firmer stand on sex
segregated workplaces, employers will have greater incentive to recruit women for
nontraditionaljobs. As the number ofwomen in such jobs increases, more employers
will acknowledge the impact they have on women's work preferences, recognize the
contributions women make to their workplaces, and hopefully take active selfinduced steps toward greater integration. These steps can give women broader
opportunities for economic self-sufficiency, a substantive change that helps fill in a
gap exposed by no-fault divorce.
As women enter new workplaces, the law must still address the gender-based
inequalities that persistently hinder women's pursuit offinancial independence. Many
women continue to face sexual harassment," 5 wage disparities, "glass ceilings,""

101. See generally Schultz, supra note 40.
102. See id. at 1839. In the context of Title VII sex segregation cases, Schultz explains that
women are often discouraged from participating in male-dominated work cultures because of
their hostile environment towards women. See id. The only real method of improving those
work environments for women is introducing greater numbers of women into those settings.
See id. However, when women attempt to break into these jobs by filing Title VII law suits,
the courts often dismiss their claims on the argument that the lack of women in maledominated jobs is a result of women's preference for more "feminine" work. See id.
103. See id. at 1838-39.
104. See id. at 1817.
105. See Mary Ann Weiss, Ninth Circuit Broadens Reasonableness Standardfor Hostile

Work EnvironmentSexual Harassment:Fuller v. City of Oakland, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 665, 665
(1997) (stating that studies predict over 50%, and up to 88%, of women will be harassed either
at work or at school).
106. The legal profession itself provides excellent examples of"glass ceilings" and "mommy
tracks." Anyone examining current National Directory of Legal Employers ("NALP") forms
for most major firms can discern the very small percentage of women who achieve partnership.
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and double standards.' The advent of sex harassment laws,'0° the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act,"° and the Family Medical Leave Act"' marks a positive step
toward eleviating discriminatory conduct against and disadvantages toward women
in the workplace. These laws, however, have not created substantive equality for
women at work. This Note will not attempt to discuss the inadequacies of these laws,
but rather suggest one opportunity for change that could improve women's financial
independence. Instead of continuing to view gender inequality in the workplace as
a "women's issue," society needs to elevate this concern to a broader sphere of
discourse.
No-fault divorce may have exposed many of the disadvantages women face
financially upon dissolution of a marriage, but reinstituting stricter divorce laws will
not remedy this problem. Rather, concern for gender equality should expand to a
more comprehensive discussion of family, employment, and the state. Encouraging
women to enter nontraditional roles must accompany encouragement of men to adopt
traditionally female roles."' By moving the discussion of gender inequality from the
realm of "women's concerns," private employers and state institutions must accept
more responsibility for women's financial status." 2
By broadening and publicizing the gender gaps exposed by no-fault divorce, more
targeted and beneficial social initiatives can make divorce a less costly decision for
women."' These are not unambitious goals. Yet, formal equality coupled with
substantive social change offers the most comprehensive solution for women's
financial independence after divorce.
D. Battered Women-PossibilitiesUnder
a No-FaultRegime
In Part II.B., this Note addressed two interrelated arguments that no-fault divorce
particularly disadvantages women in battering relationships.' First, no-fault divorce
discourages women from introducing evidence of abuse because fault plays no role
in a court's dissolution process. Second, stereotypical images ofbattered women held

Vicki Shultz's argument that hostile employment settings shape women's work preferences
could explain women's job position preferences within aparticular firm. See also Gellis, supra
note 5, at 949-50.
107. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
108. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED 103-16 (1986).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
110. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
I11. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1733. As women take on more nondomestic
responsibilities, the need for men to assume some of the domestic tasks (traditionally "female"
tasks) increases; see also, Czapanskiy, supra note 80, at 1415.
112. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 12, at 210.
113. See id.; see also Rhode, supranote 4, at 1779 (noting that the most successful strategies
for equal pay result from mobilization of women either in the form of collective bargaining or
legislative lobbying). Expanding this notion, ifequality in the workplace was cast as a societal
concern and not a women's issue, more people (other than women) would mobilize and the
power to effect legislative change through lobbying would greatly improve.
114. See supratext accompanying notes 50-54.
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by judges and testifying experts further prevent women from disclosing their
victimization to the court. As a result, many battering spouses go without blame and
accountability for their actions.
Agreeing with these observations and arguments, a return to fault-based divorce
still may not offer a better alternative for battered women. Under a fault system where
abuse qualifies as a fault, battered women would have to prove abusive behavior by
a spouse; yet, such conduct can be very difficult to document and prove legally in a
courtroom." 5 In comparison, a no-fault divorce system allows women to exit an
abusive marriage without having to jump this legal evidentiary hurdle." 6
The stereotypical images some judges harbor of battered women may disadvantage
women in a fault-based divorce proceeding just as much as in a no-fault proceeding.
When a battered woman raises the issue of abuse to the court, she can expect the
batterer to present a different version of events." 7 When presented with these two
conflicting versions, the judge must decide whom to believe-a fault-based system
requires assignment of blame, and the court must select one version of the facts." 8
Given that a judge may hold an unfavorable, poorly formed image of a battered
woman, a woman who presents her story risks disbelief."9 Therefore, a no-fault
system may afford a battered woman little opportunity to introduce evidence of
abuse, but a fault-based system that provides the avenue to assign blame may use that
evidence to her detriment.
Criticisms of both no-fault divorce and a reinstated fault-based system leave
battered women with few legal opportunities for safe and equitable departure from
an abusive marriage. The criticisms, however, illustrate the central thesis ofthis Note:
that women can only achieve equality of result with a combination of formal equality
and substantive change. Stereotypical images of battered women still pose a grave
problem under both systems. Combating these images may prove a significant
challenge, but it should embody the focal point for reform. 20
III. RISKS OF REGRESSIVE "REFORM": A CASE STUDY

In light of the many disadvantages and gender biases women experience upon
divorce, at least two alternatives for reform surface for discussion: (1) returning to a
fault-based divorce system or (2) supplementing the current no-fault system with
substantive social change. This Note has argued that alternative (1) risks the
reinforcement of a disadvantaged, unequal, gender-biased status for women, and has
advocated that the better solution is to implicate broader social change to achieve

115. See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 839.
116. See id.
117. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It'sDejai Vu All Over Again": The Covenant Marriage
Act in PopularCulture Perceptionand Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1701, 1724 (1998).
118. See id.
119. See id.

120.Martha Mahoney's contributions to increased understanding of battering relationships
marks greater legal discourse on the subject. See generallyMahoney, supra note 50. Hopefully,
this trend will continue and issue greater discussion and awareness outside the classroom and
inside the courtroom.
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equality of result. To further illustrate the choice between these two alternatives, Part
III will briefly evaluate a similar struggle to improve women's well-being once
independent of their spouse's support.
Currently, China contemplates a law that would make adultery actionable and
divorce more difficult.' 2 ' The proposed reforms would give abandoned wives a
medium with which to sue unfaithful spouses and provide for punitive damages
against a spouse's lover." 2 While the proposed law has gained widespread criticism
for its moral tone and "Middle Ages" theme,' 23 many women support the law as a
way to extract some financial support from deadbeat husbands. 24 According to one
Chinese woman, if her adulterous husband worked for the state, she would have an
avenue to relief-she could report him to his work unit, which could control his
conduct."2 Without state control, wives of cheating husbands have no legal means of
getting financial support.
Otherfactors further disadvantage Chinese women in unfulfilling marriages. China
currently has a divorce law comparable to the United States no-fault regime. 26 A
woman can obtain a divorce without assigning blame, but cannot get support from her
husband for herself or her children. 27 Because the state usually assigns housing to
men, women
who seek and obtain divorces may also be forced to leave their
12
homes. 1
The proposed infidelity and divorce law appeals to women in nonegalitarian
marriages because it ensures them some financial support. In comparison, divorcing
under China's current divorce system assumes an underlying gender equality that
currently does not exist. 29 Despite Chinese economic reforms targeted to bring
women into the workforce, women still compose a majority of fired and unemployed
workers. 30 In fact, many laws and regulations aimed at protecting women workers

121. See Erik Eckholm, China Debates Tightening Divorce and Adultery Laws, PLAIN
(Clev., Ohio), Nov. 24, 1998, at IF, available in 1998 WL 4165204; Proposed
Divorce Rules Divide China, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Nov. 18, 1998, at 05,
availablein 1998 WL 22471698; Liz Sly, ProposedFidelity Law Aimed at China's Cheating
Hearts, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1998, at I [hereinafter CheatingHearts]; Women PraiseTougher
Divorce Law in China,TIMES UNION (Alb., N.Y.), Oct. 25, 1998, at A8 [hereinafter Women
Praise],availablein 1998 WL 15817424. Many states in the United States still refuse to repeal
laws criminalizing adultery. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better orfor Worse: Adultery, Crime &
the Constitution, 30 J.FAM. L. 45 (1991-92); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (Michie 1994)
(commentary discussing adultery). The commentary states that despite strong sentiment against
the criminalization of adultery, "the committee was of the opinion that the political success of
a proposal formally to abolish this crime would, at the present time, be doubtful." Id.
122. See Cheating Hearts, supra note 121, at I.
123. Id.; see also Women Praise, supra note 12 1,atA8 (stating that the Women's Federation
in Gaungdong has gone as far as to propose that men who keep mistresses be punished by time
in forced labor camps).
124. See CheatingHearts,supra note 121, at 1; Women Praise, supra note 121, at A8.
125. See Cheating Hearts, supra note 121, at I.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of
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have either perpetuated discrimination against them or left particularly vulnerable
women with no protection at all.' Gender-based pay disparities continue to prevent
women's financial independence, a2 and high levels of sexual harassment threaten
women in their work environments.'
Compounding women's frustrating work
experiences, many Chinese women endure battering relationships that, until quite
recently, the Chinese government denied.' 34
All of these disturbing statistics demonstrate the very few avenues available for
Chinese women to achieve financial independence. Such morally coded infidelity
laws and rigid divorce laws like those proposed in China will not permanently,
substantively improve the lives of Chinese women-they will only perpetuate
Chinese women's lack of autonomy. These laws offer a "quick fix" to a very deeply
rooted legacy of second class status for Chinese women. China faces a decision much
like that currently before our state legislatures as they confront the future of divorce
law-how to remedy the gender gaps exposed by formal equality. The more
effective, more comprehensive solution is substantive social change. IfChina and the
United States truly seek to improve the lives of women, both must help change the
gender biases and economic disadvantages that continue to undermine equality of
result and women's well-being. Reinstating outdated, gender-biased laws in the name
of "reform" avoids the fundamental problems at issue and risks perpetuating sexbased disparities.
CONCLUSION

Proponents of a fault-based divorce system may have more concern for preserving
conservative "traditional family values" than for the economic and social status of
divorced women-a concern some will continue to relegate to the category of
feminist discourse. Any concern for "the family," however, must confront the
intertwined components that form, influence, and strain familial relations. Treating
women's roles in marriage and their status upon divorce as exclusively women's
issues will only perpetuate those strains that undermine family stability. Ironically,
as women make strides at home, in marriage, and in the labor force, they also risk
losing sight of the gender inequities that still linger in society-glass ceilings, sexual
harassment, date rape-and risk perpetuating the "'no problem' problem."' 35
A return to fault-based divorce poses a new risk of gender inequality. Reinstating
fault-based divorce law may preserve some family ideal, but more than ever, that
ideal does not correspond to one that most women, and men, now desire. Recognizing
the need for change, society needs to focus its efforts not on making divorce more
difficult, but on making marriage more equitable. If and when marriages dissolve, the

Chinese Women, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 285, 299 (1996).
13 1. See id. In many rural factories and private businesses, women work in "Dickensian"
conditions. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 301. According to this report, 84% of women reported being sexually
harassed. See id.
134. See id. at 286.
135. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 1-2
(1997).
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law, if supplemented with substantive social change, can help ensure that-men and
women experience the divorce free from gender bias.
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